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I. Introduction
Society has recognized family violence as a pervasive and serious
problem requiring intervention by the criminal justice system. One
form of family violence is marital rape, which is both brutal and de-
grading. Suprisingly, marital rape has not received much public atten-
tion even though it occurs with alarming frequency. Reportedly, one
out of seven women "who has ever been married, has been raped by a
1
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husband at least once, and sometimes many times over many years."1
Despite the frequency and seriousness 2 of marital rape, only seven
states have totally abolished the marital rape exemption for husbands.3
1. D. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE 2 (1982). This statement is based on a ran-
dom sample of 930 women and generalized to the population at large.
2. Schwartz, The Spousal Exemption for Criminal Rape Prosecutions, 7 VER-
MONT L. REV. 33, 46 (1983). "Rape crisis center counselors have claimed that some of
the most seriously injured women, particularly in injuries to vaginal walls, are raped
spouses." Id.
3. The marital exemption has been completely abolished in Florida, Massachu-
setts, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Oregon and Wisconsin. See FLA. STAT. §
794.011 (1983 and Supp. 1984), (State v. Smith, 401 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1981), State v. Rider, 449 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984), review
denied, 458 So. 2d 273 (1984) appeal dismissed, Rider v. Florida, 53 U.S.L.W. 3686
(U.S. March 26, 1985)(No.84-6164); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 265, § 22 (West
Supp. 1983), Commonwealth v. Chretien, 383 Mass. 123, 417 N.E.2d 1203 (1981);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319, 28-320 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2c: 14-5(b)(1982); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 130.00 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984), People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d
152, 474 N.E.2d 567, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.305 (1983);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(6)(West Supp. 1983-1984).
Thirty-five states have retained the exemption in some instances, depending on
whether spouses have separated, are living apart, have filed a petition for annulment,
divorce or separate maintenance or for third degree sexual abuse, etc.: Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington and Wyoming. See Alaska Stat. § 11.41.445(a) (1983); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-1407.D (Supp. 1983-1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1801, 41-1802, 41-
1803, 41-1804 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-409 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 53a-65, 53a-67 (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 763, 764 (1979 &
Supp. 1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 707-730, 707-731, 707-732 (Supp. 1983); IDAHO
CODE § 18-6107 (1979 & Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 12-12, 12-13, 12-14,
12-15, 12-16, 12-17, 12-18(c) (Smith Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
42-4-1(b) (Burns Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4 (West 1979 & Supp. 1984-
1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3502, 21-3517, 21-3518 (Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 510.010(3)(B) (Bobbs-Merrill 1975 & Supp. 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:41 (West Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A §§ 252.2, 253 (West 1983 &
Supp. 1983-1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 464D (1982); MICH. Comp. LAWS. ANN.
§ 750.5201 (West Supp. 1984-1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West Supp. 1984);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-99 (1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 566.010, 566.030 (Vernon
1979 & Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(2) (1983); NEv. REV. STAT. §
200.373 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:2, 632-A:3, 632-A:5 (Supp. 1983)
(exemption retained in statutory rape and cases of mentally defective victim-wives);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-9-10E, 30-9-11 (1978 & Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
27.8 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-01 (1983); OHIo REV. CODE ANN §
[Vol. 9
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In these seven states, however, even though a husband can be prose-
cuted if he rapes his wife, many obstacles to obtaining a conviction
remain.
The purpose of this note is to give practitioners and judges insight
into the problems of obtaining convictions for marital rape. The note
begins with a discussion of the background of the marital rape exemp-
tion for husbands. The historical background aids in understanding the
effect of Florida's Sexual Battery Statute4 and corresponding case law
on convictions. Finally, the note explores the attitudes of victims, po-
lice, prosecutors, judges and juries to determine their respective impact
on convictions for marital rape.
II. History of the Marital Rape Exemption; Myths and
Policies
Many states have embraced as part of their common law and
eventually within their statutes the notion that a husband cannot be
prosecuted for raping his wife. The exemption for husbands is credited
to Sir Matthew Hale, who proposed the idea in a treatise he wrote in
1736. 5 Hale, however, did not base his proposition on case law or any
2907.01L (Page 1982); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 §§ 3103, 3121 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-37-1 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-658 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); TENN.
CODE ANN § 39-2-610 (1982); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(c)(2) (Vernon Supp.
1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-407 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 18.2-61 (1982),
Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 389, 315 S.E.2d 847 (1984), Kiser v. Common-
wealth, - Va. -, 321 S.E.2d 291 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN § 9A.44.010
(Supp. 1984-1985); WYO. STAT. ANN §§ 6-2-301, 6-2-302, 6-2-306, 6-2-307 (1983).
California and West Virginia have a separate statute for marital rape. See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 262 (Deerings Supp. 1984) (requires 90 day reporting period); W.VA.
CODE § 61-8B-6 (Supp. 1984) (cohabitors are exempt).
Alabama, Georgia, Oklahoma, South Dakota and Vermont completely adhere to
the marital exemption. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-60(4), 13A-6-61 (1975 & Supp.
1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1 (1984)(retains common-law definition, requiring car-
nal knowledge); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West Supp. 1983-1984); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-1 (Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN tit. 13 § 3252 (Supp. 1984).
The District of Columbia statute is silent as to the exemption. See D.C. CODE
ANN. § 22-2801 (1981 & Supp. 1984).
4. FLA. STAT. ch. 794 (1983 & Supp. 1984).
5. 1 M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN § 629 (1736)("[T]he
hu[s]band cannot be guilty of a rape committed by him[s]elf upon his lawful wife, for
by their mutual matrimonial con[s]ent and contract the wife hath given up her[s]elf in
this kind unto her hu[s]band, which [s]he cannot retract").
1985]
3
Ruby: Problems of Convicting a Husband for the Rape of his Wife
Published by NSUWorks, 1985
Nova Law Journal
other cited authority.6 Therefore, the doctrine is without significant le-
gal underpinnings7 and is not technically a part of the common law.
Despite this shaky legal foundation, the exemption for husbands exists
in some form in most jurisdictions today8 and reflects many of the same
myths, fears and policies which prompted Sir Matthew Hale to propose
the exemption in his eighteenth century treatise.
Several myths concerning the relationship of husband and wife
and the role of women have created obstacles in prosecuting a husband
for the rape of his wife.9 The marital exemption is partially based on
the misguided belief that a wife consents to intercourse in marriage and
this consent is irrevocable. 10 Another foundation for the marital exemp-
tion is the old legal fiction that a husband and wife are one person and
the husband is that person." This single-being theory makes it impossi-
ble for a husband to be legally sanctioned for the rape of his wife since
he cannot be prosecuted for raping himself.'2 The exemption also stems
from the antiquated notion that women are property, 3 and that a hus-
band can, therefore, treat his wife any way he pleases. Another myth is
the belief that a woman must actively resist the rape in order for the
act to be considered non-consensual.14 Still another prevalent fallacy is
that if a woman has had prior sexual experience, she has probably con-
sented to the present act of rape.' 5 Finally, there is the suspicion that
women often bring rape charges which are unfounded.'" These myths
have a sometimes subtle, sometimes clear impact on the decision to
report marital rape, police inaction to the reports, discretion of the
6. Rider, 449 So. 2d at 904.
7. State v. Smith, 85 N.J. 193, 200, 426 A.2d 38, 41 (1981).
8. See supra note 3 for a review of the states which cling to the proposition in
various instances.
9. Note, Marital Rape in California: For Better or for Worse, 8 SAN. FERN. V.L.
REV. 239, 242-250 (1980).
10. Pracher, The Marital Rape Exemption: A Violation of a Woman's Right of
Privacy, 11 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 717, 721 (1981).
11. Note, The Marital Rape Exemption: Legal Sanction of Spouse Abuse, 18 J.
FAM. L. 565, 569 (1980).
12. Note, The Marital Rape Exemption, 27 Loy. L. REv. 597, 599 (1981).
13. Smith, 401 So. 2d at 1128.
14. Schwartz, An Argument for the Elimination of the Resistance Requirement
from the Definition of Forcible Rape, 16 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 567, 568-70 (1983).
15. See generally Note, If She Consented Once, She Consented Again- A Legal
Fallacy in Rape Cases, 10 VAL. U.L. REV. 127 (1976).
16. Note, The Victim of a Forcible Rape Case: A Feminist View, 11 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 335, 336 (1973).
[Vol. 9
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prosecutor to prosecute, judges' rulings, and jury decisions.
Many states have introduced rape shield statutes17 in an attempt
to protect all rape victims from the myths which tend to make them the
victims of the criminal justice system as well as the victims of rape.
Unfortunately, rape shield statutes do not always accomplish this goal.
Some states have rape shield statutes which may require victim resis-
tance or corroboration of the rape, or authorize jury instructions which
insinuate the victim may not be telling the truth"8 or permit the admis-
sion of the victim's prior sexual conduct into evidence to prove consent.
These three statutory requirements provide a thin shield. The resistance
requirement is based on the myth that a truly chaste woman would
"resist to the utmost""9 to protect her honor. However, because resis-
tance can be fatal and because the victim's common and automatic
17. The following rape shield statutes deal with the admissibility of evidence of
prior sexual conduct: ALA. CODE § 12-21-203 (Supp. 1984); ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045
(1980); ARK. STAT. ANN § 41-1810.1, .2, .4 (1977 & Supp. 1983); CAL. EvID. CODE §
1103 (Deering 1967 & Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-407 (1978 & Supp.
1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86F (West 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3509
(1979); FLA. STAT. § 794.022 (1983); GA. CODE ANN § 24-2-3 (1982 & Supp. 1984);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 626 R.412 (Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE § 18-6105 (1979 & Supp.
1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); IND. CODE Ann. §
35-37-4-4 (Burns Supp. 1984); IowA CODE ANN. R.412 (West Supp. 1984); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3525 (Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN § 510.145 (Bobbs-Merrill
Supp. 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:498 (West 1981 & Supp. 1984); MD. ANN.
CODE. art. 27, § 461A (1982 & Supp. 1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.233, § 21B
(West Supp. 1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West Supp. 1984); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.347 (West Supp. 1984); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-70 (Supp. 1983);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.015 (Vernon Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-503(5)
(1984); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-321 to 323 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.090 (1981);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 632-A:6 (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN § 2A: 84A-32.1 to .2
(West Supp. 1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-16 (1978 & Supp. 1983); N.Y. CRIM.
PROc. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.6 (1981); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-20-14 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.02(D)-.02(F) (PAGE 1983);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 750 (West Supp. 1983); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. ch 18, §
3104 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-22-15 (1979); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-17-119 (1982); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.065 (Vernon Supp.
1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3255 (Supp. 1984); VA. CODE § 18.2-67.7 (1982);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.020. (West Supp. 1984);W.VA. CODE [[ 61-6B-11
(Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. § 972.11(2)(b) (Supp. 1983); WYo. STAT. § 6-2-312 (1983).
18. See generally Hibey, The Trial of a Rape Case: An Advocate's Analysis of
Corroboration, Consent and Character, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 309 (1973).
19. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 568-70.
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reaction is to freeze rather than fight back,20 states with the resistance
requirement may be promoting more harm than good. The basis for the
corroboration requirement is Sir Matthew Hale's proposition that a
charge of rape is easily made and hard to defend.21 The judge's cau-
tionary instructions to the jury to consider the "weight and quality"22
of the evidence presented by the victim is based on the same rationale.
These instructions tend to plant in the juror's mind the notion that the
victim's credibility should be examined more carefully in a rape case
than in other types of cases.2a Finally, evidence of prior sexual conduct
is sometimes admitted to imply that if "she consented once, she con-
sented again."2 Admission of this evidence in marital rape cases makes
prosecution especially difficult since there will almost always have been
prior consensual sexual relations. The element of consent is perhaps the
most critical issue in a case of rape. Prior sexual conduct and evidence
of general reputation, if admitted, may also impact on the credibility of
the victim. 25
In addition to the many myths, the marital exemption rests on the
fear that women will falsely charge their husbands with rape in retalia-
tion for a perceived wrong.26 This fear creates an apprehension that
removing the exemption will open the floodgates of litigation, and
courts will be unable to handle the onslaught.2 An additional justifica-
tion for the exemption is the belief that the fear and humiliation exper-
ienced by a victim of spousal rape is not as great as the fear and humil-
iation experienced by a victim who is raped by a stranger.2 8
Finally, there are two underlying policy rationales that impact on
the marital exemption and the problems of proof. First is the belief that
states should not interfere with the "sanctity of marriage".29 The argu-
ment is that the state should foster family unity and not aid in divorce,
20. Id. at 576-82.
21. Hale, supra note 5, § 635. See also Note, Rape Reform Legislation and
Evidentiary Concerns: The Law in Pennsylvania, 44 U. PiTT. L. REV. 955, 973 (1983).
22. FLA. STAT. § 794.022(1)(1975)(amended in 1983 to delete the cautionary
instruction).
23. Note, supra note 21, at 973.
24. See generally Note, supra note 15, at 127.
25. Id. at 132.
26. Note, supra note 12, at 600. See also Pracher, supra note 10, at 732-37.
27. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 52.
28. Id. at 45-46. See also Harmon, Consent, Harm and Marital Rape, 22 J.
FAM. L. 423, 432 (1983-1984).
29. See Note, supra note 12, at 603.
356 [Vol. 9
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since if a wife charges her husband with rape, the marriage will be
likely over with little chance for reconciliation. 30 The second policy be-
hind the exemption is the idea that proving a case of marital rape is
next to impossible, 31 and that, the exemption for husbands is realistic
and should, therefore, continue.
III. Florida's Sexual Battery Statute and Florida Cases: Ob-
taining Convictions for Marital Rape
Florida's present Sexual Battery Statute, section 794 of the Flor-
ida statutes32 was enacted in 1974 and makes no mention of spousal
immunity. Prior to 1974, Florida's rape statute3 reflected the common-
law myths and notions about rape. The earlier statute provided that a
person was guilty of rape if he "unlawfully ravished and carnally"'"
knew another. Since carnal knowledge of one's wife was considered
lawful under the old statute, husbands were exempt from prosecution
for raping their wives.35 One early interpretation of the present statute,
Florida Statute section 794, was that because the marital exemption
was not mentioned, there was still a common law exception for hus-
bands.36 Between 1974 and 1980, there were no reported cases involv-
ing marital rape which tested the present Florida Statutes section 794
to determine if it included a spousal exemption. However, since 1981
two cases have held that there is no interspousal exemption excluding a
husband from prosecution for the sexual battery of his wife.37 Although
the Florida Third and Fifth District Courts of Appeal have recognized
30. Id. at 602. See also Note, supra note 9, at 246; People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d
152, 474 N.E.2d 567, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1984)(the court rejected this argument as
lacking a rational basis in an equal protection challenge).
31. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 48-51; See also People v. Brown, - Colo..,
632 P.2d 1025 (1981)(asserting problems of proof in marital rape which justify statu-
tory exclusion of husbands from prosecution).
32. FLA. STAT. §§ 794.011-.05 (1974).
33. FLA. STAT. § 794.01 (1973).
34. Id.
35. See Note, Florida's Sexual Battery Statute: Significant Reform but Bias
Against the Victim Still Prevails, 30 U. FLA. L. REv. 419, 429 (1978).
36. Id.
37. Smith, 401 So. 2d at 1127 (there is no common-law exemption in a factual
situation where the couple were separated, had filed for a divorce and a restraining
order was issued); Rider, 449 So. 2d. at 904 (holds that there is no interspousal exemp-
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that husbands can be prosecuted for spousal rape,38 Florida Statutes
section 794, nonetheless, inherently retains some of the myths about
rape which may limit convictions. The statute recognizes four levels of
severity, and the punishment reflects the age of the victim and the de-
gree of force used. 39 Subsections (3), (4) and (5) of section 794.01140
are particularly relevant to marital rape.4 1
A. Florida Statutes Section 794.011(3)-Life Felony
A husband who is convicted of sexual battery upon his wife under
Florida Statutes section 794.011(3) is guilty of a life felony. 2 Section
794.011(3) requires lack of consent and the use of a deadly weapon, or
the use of actual physical force likely to cause serious personal injury. 3
Serious personal injury is defined as "great bodily harm or pain, per-
manent disability, or permanent disfigurement. ' 44 Because of the his-
tory of prior consensual sexual relations in a marriage, the prosecutor
may not be induced to bring charges against a husband unless the se-
verity of violence required by Florida Statutes section 794.011(3) ex-
ists. 45 Police will more likely make an arrest in marital disputes where
there are serious injuries;46 however, since the punishment involved
may be life imprisonment, the jury will examine both the victim and
38. Smith, 401 So. 2d at 1127; Rider, 449 So. 2d at 904.
39. Note, supra note 35, at 422.
40. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(3), (4), (5) (1983 & Supp. 1984).
41. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(2) (Supp. 1984) will not be discussed since it addresses
sexual battery of a person twelve years old or younger, and is therefore not applicable
to marital rape.
42. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(3)(a) (1983) states:
For a life felony committed prior to Oct 1, 1983, by a term of imprison-
ment for life, or a term of years, not less than 30; and for a life felony
committed on or after Oct 1, 1983, by a term of imprisonment for life, or a
term of imprisonment not exceeding 40 years.
See also FLA. STAT. 775.083(I)(a) (1983)(indicating there may also be a fine of fifteen
thousand dollars) and FLA. STAT. § 775.084 (1983)(providing for imposition of an ex-
tended term based on the accused's prior record).
43. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(3) (1983 & Supp. 1984).
44. FLA. STAT. § 794.011 (1)(g) (Supp. 1984).
45. L. LERMAN, PROSECUTION OF SPOUSE ABUSE: INNOVATIONS IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE RESPONSE (1981). See also News/Sun Sentinel, Sept. 1, 1984, at Al, col. 1
(William Rider was found guilty of raping his wife after he beat her, bound her to the
bed with duct tape, and raped her. She required hospital treatment.).
46. L. LERMAN, supra note 45, at 26.
[Vol. 9
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her testimony very closely.' 7 Even in a violent situation, the jury will
usually acquit the accused when he and the victim have had a prior
sexual relationship."8 Therefore, while the existence of physical violence
evidenced by severe physical injury to the victim is likely to result in
police action on the reported incident, and prosecution by prosecutors,49
the jury may still fail to convict the husband either because of the prior
sexual relationship,50 or the severity of the punishment, or both.51
Convictions are also unlikely under the portion of Florida Statute
section 794.011(3) which provides for a life felony for the threatened
use of a deadly weapon without serious personal injury. The jury may
decide that the lack of severe personal injury does not warrant a con-
viction when the penalty is so severe,52 and, therefore, may acquit the
defendant.5 3 As a compromise, even though the attack may meet the
requirements of section 794.011(3), the jury may be inclined to convict
a husband on a lesser included offense or on an alternate charge be-
cause the punishment will be less severe.5 ' In order to be assured of
convicting on a lesser included offense or alternate charge, the prosecu-
tor must object to jury instructions which do not instruct on appropri-
ate lesser included offenses.5  Also, the prosecutor must plead on alter-
native grounds in some instances because some sections of the statute
which provide lesser penalties are not necessarily lesser included of-
fenses, unless they contain all the elements of the more serious of-
fense.5 6 An offense that is not a lesser included offense must be "spelled
out in the accusatory pleading. '57
47. Schwartz & Clear, Towards a New Law on Rape, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 129,
134 (1980).
48. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 251 (1966).
49. L. LERMAN, supra note 45, at 39.
50. H KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 48.
51. Schwartz & Clear, supra note 47.
52. Id.
53. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 48.
54. Findlay, The Cultural Context of Rape, 60 WOMAN L.J. 199, 205 (1974).
55. See Davenport v. State, 429 So. 2d, 1352 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983),
where the court found that failure "to instruct the jury as requested on battery as an
appropriate lesser included offense of sexual battery, was per se reversible error". Id. at
1353-54.
56. See, e.g., Bragg v. State, 433 So. 2d 1375, 1377 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1983)("[s]exual battery using slight force is not a necessarily included offense of sexual
battery under subsection (3), when the defendant is charged with the use or threatened
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B. Florida Statutes Section 794.011(4)(a), (b), (c)-Felony of
the First Degree
A felony of the first degree58 will result if the husband is convicted
of any of the listed offenses in section 794.011(4). Three subsections of
794.011(4) are relevant to marital sexual battery.59  Section
794.011(4)(a) permits a conviction for sexual battery "[w]hen the vic-
tim is physically helpless to resist."' 0 The phrase "physically helpless to
resist" is defined as sexual battery against a person who is "uncon-
scious, asleep, or for any other reason is physically unable to communi-
cate unwillingness to an act."61
According to one theory, however, a husband's intercourse with his
wife who is physically helpless to resist is not the type of violence that
truly represents marital rape.6 2 This permissive-license theory is based
on the idea that in marriage there exists permissive consent to inter-
course, having characteristics of a license. 63 The license is not revoked
until an objection is made."4 In the case of a wife who is sleeping, un-
conscious or physically unable to communicate unwillingness to inter-
course, the permissive-license of consent to sexual relations has not
been revoked. 5 Without revocation there is no sexual battery because
the wife has in effect consented, and sexual battery, of course, requires
a lack of consent by the victim. 6 Permissive-license theorists believe
that reforms such as the "physically helpless to resist"6 7 subsection of
the Florida statute do not apply in marital rape cases and detract from
the seriousness of what they perceive as real marital rape, which is a
violent crime.68 However, under the permissive-license theory, Florida
Statutes section 794.011(4)(a) is applicable in non-marital situations,
58. See FLA. STAT. § 775.082(3)(b) (1983) which provides for a penalty of im-
prisonment not to exceed thirty years. See also FLA. STAT. § 775.083 (1)(b) (1983)
indicating that a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars may also be required. FLA.
STAT. § 775.084(4)(a)(1) (1983) provides a life sentence for a "habitual offender".
59.FLA. STAT. § 794.011(4)(a), (b), (c) (1983 & Supp. 1984)
60. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(4)(a) (1983 & Supp. 1984)
61. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(1)(e) (Supp. 1984).
62. Harmon, supra note 28, at 429.
63. Id. at 434.
64. Id. at 435.
65. Id. at 437.
66. See FLA. STAT. § 794.011(4) (1983 & Supp. 1984).
67. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(4)(a) (1983 & Supp. 1984).
68. Harmon, supra note 28, at 429.
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since there is not a permissive license of consent to intercourse.69
Despite the existence of the permissive-license theory, one may ar-
gue that section 794.011(4)(a) does apply in marital rape cases. The
defense of consent in any rape case requires that the consent be "intel-
ligent, knowing, and voluntary. ' 70 One cannot give intelligent, knowing,
and voluntary consent when asleep. Common sense, however, indicates
that intercourse while a wife is sleeping, without more, will not in all
likelihood motivate a jury to convict for this first degree felony. As in-
dicated, juries are reluctant to convict when there is a prior relation-
ship, even with evidence of violence.7 1 For these reasons, the hyperbolic
conclusion is that unless the wife is in a coma and the husband repeat-
edly rapes his wife in the presence of witnesses, a violation of section
794.011 (4)(a) will not likely result in a conviction.
Two other subsections of section 794.011(4) deal with threats of
violence. These subsections proscribe perhaps the most common sexual
batteries between husbands and wives. Subsection 794.011(4)(b) pro-
vides a first degree felony penalty when an "offender coerces the victim
to submit by threatening to use force or violence likely to cause serious
personal injury on the victim and the victim reasonably believes that
the offender has the present ability to execute the threats. ' 72 Subsec-
tion (c) provides the same first degree penalty if the offender threatens
"to retaliate against the victim or any other person, and the victim rea-
sonably believes that the offender has the ability to execute the threats
in the future. '7 3 Retaliation "includes, but is not limited to, threats of
future physical punishment. . .. "74 Studies have shown that more
than one-third of battered women have been raped by their husbands.7 5
"Women may accede to sexual intercourse with their husbands to avoid
being battered. . . . [s]ome husbands regard a wife's refusal of sexual
intercourse as grounds for beating or intimidation. ' 76 Therefore, bat-
tery or the threat of battery against wives by their husbands often in-
69. Id. at 438.
70. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(1)(a) (Supp. 1984).
71. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 48, at 251.
72. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(4)(b) (1983 & Supp. 1984).
73. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(4)(c) (1983 & Supp. 1984).
74. FLA. STAT. § 794.011 (1)(f) (Supp. 1984).
75. Findelhor & Yllo, Forced Sex in Marriage: A Preliminary Research Report,
28 CRINIE & DELINQ. 459, 460 (1982)(citing studies made by Spektor, Giles-Sims, and
Pagelow).
76. Freeman, "But If You Can't Rape Your Wife; Who[m] Can You Rape?"
The Marital Rape Exemption Re-examined, 15 FAm. L.Q. 1, 5 (1981).
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cludes sexual battery."'
Evidence presented by a wife at trial that she suffered from bat-
tered wife syndrome7 8 would be useful to support her claim of sexual
battery under Florida Statutes section 794.011(4), subsections (b) and
(c).11 A spouse who remains in a situation where she has been physi-
cally abused more than once is referred to as a battered wife. 80 The
battering episodes usually run in cycles, with three distinct stages."
The episodes begin with minor battering incidents which then intensify
into more serious violence, and finally into a stage of contrition and
reconciliation, until the cycle begins again.8 2 However, evidence of bat-
tered wife syndrome would be inadmissible if its admission was solely
for the purpose of showing bad character or propensity of the husband
to commit the crime. 3 Nonetheless, such evidence has been admitted
in homicides where the defense was self-defense, to show that the party
had a reasonable and honest belief she was in danger of serious bodily
harm. 4 Because subsections (b) and (c) of Florida Statutes section
794.011(4) require that the "victim reasonably believe that the of-
fender has the ability to execute these threats,"8 5 evidence of battered
wife syndrome would aid the jury in determining the reasonableness
and honesty of her belief. In homicides, self-defense is usually an overt,
77. Id. at 5, 6.
78. Finesmith, Police Response to Battered Women: A Critique and Proposals
for Reform, 14 SFrON HALL L. REV. 74, 82 (1983). Battered wife syndrome is the
term used to describe typical reactions of physically abused women. A battered wife
often does not leave her husband or seek other relief because of a feeling of helpless-
ness, lack of other emotional and economic resources and a fear of retaliation by her
husband.
79. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(b)(c) (1983 & Supp. 1984).
80. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 193, 478 A.2d 364, 371 (1984)(citing L.
WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979)).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(a) (1983).
84. In Kelly, 97 N.J. at 204, 478 A.2d. at 377, the court stated that the expert's
testimony on the battered woman syndrome is admissible, in a homicide, as relevant to
the honesty and reasonableness of defendant's belief that deadly force was necessary to
protect her against death or serious bodily harm. See Borders v. State, 433 So. 2d
1325, 1327 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983), where the court noted that in a homicide,
testimony of a clinical psychologist relating to battered wife syndrome should be al-
lowed if the trial court feels it is sufficiently developed and the expert is qualified. See
also Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied
mem., 415 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1982).
85. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(4)(b), (c) (1983 & Supp. 1984).
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aggressive act, undertaken to protect one's self from serious bodily
harm or death.86 In sexual battery, on the other hand, self-defense is
often a passive act of submission, also undertaken to protect one's self
from serious bodily harm. Although the act of self-defense in sexual
battery is often passive, the similarity to the concept of self-protection
indicates that the admission of battered wife syndrome evidence is jus-
tified under Florida's Sexual Battery Statute in marital rape cases. 7
Because many of these wives will use the passive method of self-de-
fense, evidence that she has been battered in the past will show that she
reasonably believed her husband had the ability to carry out his
threats. With the admission of battered wife syndrome evidence, a wife
with a history of being abused may be viewed by the jury as a more
credible witness than a rape victim who did not previously know her
assailant. Evidence of past abuse will reinforce her credibility by prov-
ing to the jury the reasonableness of her fear of future or present retali-
ation, and provide an explanation for her submission to the sexual bat-
tery. Of course, the danger of admitting the evidence is that jurors may
decide the battered wife consented to the violence because she stayed in
the relationship with her husband. Actually, there is an array of socio-
logical reasons the battered wife remains with her husband, but true
consent to the abuse is not one of them.88 In Hawthorne v. State,8 9 for
example, the court ruled that expert testimony regarding battered wife
syndrome was admissible in a first degree homicide where the defense
was self defense. This court reasoned that the testimony was necessary
to inform the jury that staying in the home was reasonable because it is
a common symptom of the syndrome.90 In Borders v. State,91 the court
reversed and remanded a first degree homicide conviction, ruling that
expert testimony on battered wife syndrome is admissible as long as the
trial court finds the expert is qualified and "the subject matter is suffi-
ciently developed so that it can support an expert opinion." 92 In Bor-
ders, the husband and wife often drank alcohol, which led to violent
fights. The husband beat his wife with his fists and sometimes used
weapons such as a frying pan. The fights were often so severe that
86. Hawthorne, 408 So. 2d at 806.
87. There have not been any Florida cases applying this rationale to sexual bat-
tery as yet.
88. Kelley, 97 N.J. at 194-97, 478 A.2d at 372-73.
89. Hawthorne, 408 So. 2d at 801.
90. Id. at 807.
91. 433 So. 2d at 1325.
92. Id. at 1327.
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friends and the couple's children would intervene because they feared
that the wife would be killed. On the day of the homicide, the couple
had been drinking and began arguing. The husband punched his wife
in the breast. The wife ordered her husband out of the house, he left
for a short while and then returned. When he returned, a shoving
match occurred. The wife, armed with a kitchen knife, stabbed her
husband, who was dead when authorities arrived. 3 The court asserted
that in a homicide prosecution the defendant should be allowed to in-
troduce a wide array of testimony to support a self-defense theory.94
Arguably, the court should afford the victim of sexual battery the same
latitude. Evidence of battered wife syndrome should be admitted to
show the reasonableness of the wife's beliefs that her husband will
carry out his threats. If evidence of previous wife battering is inadmis-
sible, a wife may be at a greater disadvantage than the victim of a rape
by a stranger. The jury may find that a wife would not reasonably be-
lieve that her own husband would actually carry out such threats, and
therefore the jury may not convict him.
C. Florida Statutes Section 794.011(5)-Felony of the Second
Degree
Florida Statutes section 794.011(5) provides for a penalty of fel-
ony in the second degree95 for sexual battery involving a lower level of
force than required for the first degree felony sections of the statute.
Section 794.011(5) provides a sanction when the offender uses "physi-
cal force and violence not likely to cause serious personal injury."9' 6
With married couples, the use of this level of force97 may not be viewed
as sexual battery by the jury. The jury, as a cross-section of the com-
munity, will reflect common attitudes about rape. Some women do not
consider a coercive act of intercourse as rape even when there is a lack
of mutual consent to the intercourse.9
93. Id. at 1326.
94. Id.
95. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(3)(c) (1983) provides for a term of imprisonment not
to exceed fifteen years. FLA. STAT. § 775.083(1)(b) (1983) indicates the penalty may
include a fine of up to ten thousand dollars. FLA. STAT. § 775.084(4)(a)(2) (1983)
notes that habitual offenders may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment not to exceed
thirty years.
96. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(5) (1983 & Supp. 1984).
97. Freeman, supra note 76, at 5.
98. Russell, supra note 1, at 2.
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It is likely that some jurors have themselves experienced this type
of forced intercourse in marriage. If a female juror admits that this
level of force constitutes a sexual battery, she would in many cases be
admitting that she herself has been sexually battered by her own hus-
band. If a male juror admits this level of force constitutes sexual bat-
tery, he would in many cases be admitting that he himself is a rapist. It
is doubtful that either a male or female juror would want to admit this.
Also, jurors who have not experienced this form of sexual battery in
marriage may tend to disbelieve that such conduct occurs in marriage.
Therefore, convictions for sexual battery with this level of force will be
difficult to obtain. Without evidence of great physical force, or admis-
sion of prior wife abuse, the jury may feel the wife consented to the
intercourse. 9 There is generally an abhorrent disbelief that any man
would commit rape, especially against his wife, and therefore the jury
may distrust the wife's complaint. 100
D. Florida Statutes Section 794.022-Rape Shield
Rape shield laws deal with important rules of evidence, which are
intended to protect the victim of rape from becoming a victim of the
criminal justice system. The rape shield portion of the statute was sub-
stantially rewritten and amended in 1983.101
Section 794.022(1)102 was amended to delete the following cau-
tionary instruction to the jury: "The court may instruct the jury with
respect to the weight and quality of the evidence." 0 3 The removal of
the cautionary instruction is an important step in removing judicial
sanction of the notion that many rape claims are unfounded. 0 The
present subsection states, "[t]he testimony of the victim need not be
corroborated." 10 5 Although corroboration is not required under the
statute, courts admit various forms of corroborating evidence, including
99. Note, Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of Rape, 43 U. CHI. L. REV.
613, 618 (1976).
100. Id. at 616.
101. FLA. STAT. § 794.022(1), (2), (3) (1983)(amending Fla. Stat. § 794.022(1),
(2) (1975)).
102. FLA. STAT. § 794.022(1) (1983).
103. FLA. STAT. § 794.022(1) (1975) included the instruction in the text of the
statute.
104. J. WIGMORE, ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COM-
MON LAW § 924(a) at 459 (1940)(many were falsely charged of rape and convicted).
105. FLA. STAT. § 794.022(1) (1983).
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evidence of physical injury, presence of semen, and testimony of wit-
nesses if available: "[T]he fact remains that proof of rape in most cases
is sufficient only when the evidence is corroborated."106
In marital sexual battery there may be little, if any, evidence of
physical injury unless the level of violence is quite severe. The presence
of semen will not be indicative of non-consensual intercourse in the
same degree as in non-marital sexual battery, and it is unlikely that
there will be any corroborating witnesses. The absence of the need for
corroboration, directed by the statute, is therefore helpful. Realisti-
cally, despite the progressiveness of the amended statute, cases of mari-
tal sexual battery will need corroborating evidence to prove that non-
consensual sexual battery occurred.
The greatest barrier to a marital rape conviction is the language of
section 794.022(2), which deals with the admissibility of evidence con-
cerning "specific instances of prior sexual activity between the victim
and any other than the offender. . ". ."10O This barrier stems from the
retention of a disputable myth, that prior specific acts of sexual con-
duct are relevant to the issue of consent.108 This myth is based on the
premise that an unchaste woman will lie,109 and a belief that once a
person has had prior voluntary sexual intercourse, she most likely has
consented in the subsequent instance of rape. 110 The statute forbids the
introduction of evidence of prior sexual activity, unless it establishes a
pattern of conduct which is relevant to consent,111 or tends "to prove
the defendant was not the origin of the semen, pregnancy, injury, or
disease."11 2 The court must first have a hearing in camera to determine
106. Hibey, supra note 18, at 314.
107. FLA. STAT. § 794.022(2) (1983).
108. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 750.520j(1)(b) (1975)(declares all
evidence of prior sexual conduct with persons other than the accused is inadmissible,
unless it shows the source of semen was not the defendant's, or where there is preg-
nancy, or disease). See also J. MARSH, A. GEIST & N. CAPLAN, Rape and the Limits of
Law Reform, 23 (1982)(the elimination of such evidence in Michigan was due to its
"irrelevance and highly prejudicial and inflammatory nature").
109. Note, supra note 99, at 626.
110. Id. at 624.
111. See McElveen v. State, 415 So. 2d 746, 747 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1982)(three specific incidents of prior sexual activity do not show a pattern of conduct
relevant to the issue of consent). See also Winters v. State, 425 So. 2d 203, 204 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Hodges v. State, 386 So. 2d 888, 889 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1980).
112. FLA. STAT. § 794.022(2) (1983).
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if there is a pattern of conduct relevant to the issue of consent.113 Prior
to the 1983 amendment, the relevance of the pattern of conduct was
supposed to be decided outside the presence of the jury, but in practice
this was rarely done.1 " The requirement of an in camera hearing is an
effort to guard the victim's privacy. The need for an in camera hearing
gives credence to the view that such evidence is usually highly
prejudicial.115
In a marital situation, evidence of prior sexual activity which es-
tablishes a pattern of conduct is admissible in two ways. First, the prior
sexual relationship between the husband and wife is admissible. It is
possible that prior unusual sexual conduct between a husband and wife
will be exposed and used to prove that the act of violence before the
court was a normal part of the couple's relationship, indicating consent
to the present sexual battery. Second, if a married woman established a
pattern of extramarital sexual conduct, this also is admissible. Deviant
extramarital conduct, if it establishes a pattern of conduct indicative of
consent, will be admitted to demonstrate consent to the sexual battery.
However, neither of these types of behaviors necessarily establish con-
sent to the particular act before the court, especially when the act was
performed with violence and force."' The fact that a person has had
prior consensual sexual relations with another person has no bearing on
whether there was consent to the present act. It is outrageous to even
consider that a person consents to violence.
However, in the minds of jurors, extramarital sex, if admitted, is
likely to cause the jurors to develop unconscious hostility toward the
victim." '7 Also, prior consensual activity with the offender may imply,
in the minds of jurors, consent to the present sexual battery." 8 This
emphasis on the victim's behavior, rather than on the offender's, behav-
ior should be eliminated from the statute because it has been shown to
be of little probative value." 9 The admission of prior sexual relations
113. Id.
114. FLA. STAT. § 794.022(2) (1979). See also Note, supra note 35, at 439
n.154.
115. Note, supra note 15, at 159.
116. Schwartz & Clear, supra note 47, at 137 "One does not think to ask the
victim of assault for proof he or she is not a masochist, or provide a life history of all
previous assaults, to establish a pattern that might mitigate the assailant's culpability".
Id.
117. See Note, supra note 15, at 155.
118. Id. at 146.
119. See Note, supra note 35, at 440-41. Note, supra note 16, at 345. See also
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with the defendant, as well as sexual relations with others, if a pattern
of conduct is shown to be relevant to the issue of consent, creates a
difficult evidentiary obstacle for a married woman to overcome.
The two redeeming features of the 1983 amendment to Florida
Statutes section 794.022120 are the requirement of an in camera hear-
ing and the elimination of the cautionary instruction to the jury. With-
out the safeguard of an in camera hearing it is doubtful that a married
woman would ever seek to prosecute her husband for sexual battery
because she knows every detail of their marital history would be over-
heard by courtroom spectators, and possibly even the jury.'21 Also, the
cautionary instruction to the jury, to consider the victim's testimony
with extra care, would discourage victims from bringing charges
against their spouse, because it may promote the feeling that the victim
is also on trial.
The last subsection is a new addition to the statute. 22 Florida
Statutes subsection 794.022(3), delineates a per se rule against the ad-
mission of "reputation evidence relating to a victim's prior sexual con-
duct,"' 2  despite any other provision of law. 124 This addition helps to
ensure that a victim's credibility will not be undermined by inferences
of immorality by general reputation evidence. The exclusion of such
evidence is an attempt to abrogate the common-law myth that unchaste
women are liars. 25 In the marital context, the inadmissibility of repu-
tation evidence will be as important as it will be in non-marital sexual
battery.
It appears that the statute permits the admissibility of specific acts
of prior sexual conduct under the conditions delineated under Florida
supra note 17 for rape shield statutes of other states, in relation to prior sexual
conduct.
120. FLA. STAT. § 794.022(2) (1983).
121. Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom,
77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 88 (1977).
122. FLA. STAT. § 794.022(3) (1983). The prior statute did not mention reputa-
tion evidence. It was thought that since such evidence was admissible at common law,
it was admissible under the statute. See Note, supra note 35, at 437. See also McEl-
veen, 415 So. 2d at 746.
123. FLA. STAT. § 794.022(3) (1983)("Notwithstanding any other provisions of
law" establishes the per se rule).
124. Previously, the controlling statute was FLA. STAT. § 90.404(l)(b)(l) (1983).
This statute provided for the admission of "evidence of pertinent trait of character of
the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the trait,
." under the sexual battery statute. Id.
125. See Schwartz, supra note 14; Note, supra note 15.
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Statutes section 794.022(2), holding on to the myth that such conduct
is indicative of consent. The husband will invariably raise the issue of
consent, as an affirmative defense, in virtually all cases of marital sex-
ual battery. 26 The retention of the myth that previous sexual relations
indicates consent to the present act is a formidable barrier to convic-
tion. Counteracting the jury's inclination to disbelieve the existence of
rape in marriage, however, is perhaps the most difficult obstacle of
all. 127
E. Resistance
The Florida Sexual Battery Statute does not require resistance.128
However, case law indicates resistance may be an important factor in
the minds of the judges and juries. In State v. Hudson, 29 the offender
grabbed the victim, pulled off her clothes, yanked her out of the car
and threatened to seriously injure her.1 30 The victim testified that she
submitted out of fear for her physical safety. 31 The court hinted that
this was effective resistance. The Florida Second District Court of Ap-
peal held that "questions of consent, force, resistance, and fear, are
particularly within the province of the jury to determine. "132 Appar-
ently, in Florida resistance by the victim is sometimes important to
demonstrate a lack of consent, but the need for resistance to show lack
of consent is unrealistic and dangerous to the life of the victim.133 To
infer that lack of resistance implies consent is a throwback to the myth
that a virtuous woman would "resist to the utmost"1 34 to defend her
honor. "There are many situations in which resistance is not a valid
measure of lack of consent by rape victims. '"135
126. Note, Criminal Law--Sexual Battery-No Interspousal Exception Under
Florida's Sexual Battery Statute-State v. Smith, 401 So. 2d. 1126 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1981), 10 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 326, 336 (1982).
127. Pracher, supra note 10, at 732. The same point was made in a telephone
interview with Jayne Weintraub, prosecutor in the case of State v. Rider (Aug. 14,
1984). Weintraub expressed the view that getting the jury to believe a husband can
rape his wife is the most difficult barrier in the prosecution.
128. Note, supra note 35, at 426-29.
129. 397 So. 2d 426, 428 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
130. Id. at 427.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See generally Schwartz, supra note 14, at 577-82.
134. Id. at 569.
135. Id. at 582.
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Florida recognizes sexual battery as an act of violence, not a sex-
ual act."3 8 Since assault and battery do not require resistance by the
victim, 13 7 the need for resistance in sexual battery must be solely re-
lated to old common-law myths about rape, and should be abolished. In
State v. Rider,'38 for example, the court concluded that "the legislature
by repealing the rape statute and enacting the sexual battery statute,
intended to abrogate any common-law assumptions concerning the
crime of rape."' 39 It is apparent, however, that the common-law myths
regarding prior sexual conduct and resistance continue to exist in Flor-
ida law. Florida courts should consider issuing jury instructions which
advise the jury that lack of resistance is not indicative of consent to
sexual battery. To expect resistance from a wife, when there is, at the
very least, fear of possible violence, which may or may not cause seri-
ous personal injury, is to put a burden on the victim of sexual battery
that is not placed on most other victims of crime. 40 "[T]o impute con-
sent on the part of the victim exceeds the bounds of the law of
consent."''
IV. Attitudes of Victims, Police, Prosecutors, Judges and Ju-
rors: Impact on Marital Rape Convictions
Although Florida Statutes section 794, with its gradations of pun-
ishments reflecting levels of force, provides an adequate framework for
marital rape convictions, a serious impediment within the statute to
successful prosecutions lies with the admissibility of evidence of specific
prior sexual activity. Also, case law, which permits the jury to consider
resistance of the victim, results in inconsistencies that could effectively
bar convictions. However, the major barriers to convictions do not lie
within the statute, or within case law. Non-reporting by victims, police
inaction, prosecutorial discretion, and the attitudes of judges and juries
are the primary obstacles to successful prosecutions and convictions for
marital rape. Even when a statute or case law permits the prosecution
of husbands for marital rape, the problems in obtaining convictions for
marital rape are exacerbated by the attitudes of the participants in the
136. Smith, 401 So. 2d at 1127.
137. Schwartz & Clear, supra note 46, at 146.
138. 449 So. 2d at 903.
139. Id. at 906.
140. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 583-88.
141. Pracher, supra note 10, at 730.
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A. Victim Awareness and Cooperation
"One of the simplest and most effective ways that a victim can
prevent a wrongdoer from being arrested and prosecuted is to fail to
report the crime ... . It is generally thought that the crime of rape
is the most unreported type of crime in the United States. 44 There are
no precise figures to indicate the number of spouses who do not report
marital rape. One reason marital rape is seldom reported is that most
states do not recognize rape in marriage in all situations,1 45 as a
crime.1 46 In those states where the marital rape exemption has not been
totally abolished, a husband has, in essence, a license to commit the
debilitating and degrading crime of rape against his wife.14 7
There have been few prosecutions 148 in states whose laws permit
husbands to be prosecuted for marital rape, which may indicate that
although the exemption for husbands is removed by statute or case law,
the'attitudes of victims, as well as those in the criminal justice system,
are predominate factors in perpetuating the existence of the marital
exemption. "In the case of marital rape, all the reasons that deter
women from bringing rape charges [in non-marital rape] are exacer-
bated.' 4 9 Marital rape is often only reported when it is accompanied
by other violence. 150 Studies have shown that despite the level of vio-
lence used, some married women do not realize or admit they have
been raped by their husbands.' 5' The attitude of the victim is one of
denial, and inability or refusal to conceive of the violent sexual attack
as rape.
142. Beinen, Rape Reform Legislation in the United States: A Look at Some
Practical Effects, 8 VICTIMOLOGY 139, 140 (1983).
143. Hall, The Role of the Victim in the Prosecution and Disposition of a Crimi-
nal Case, 28 VAND. L. REv. 931, 934-35 (1975).
144. Freeman, supra note 76, at 6.
145. See supra note 3.
146. Barry, Spousal Rape: The Uncommon Law, 66 A.B.A.J. 1088, 1090 (1980).
147. See generally Griffin, In 44 States It's Legal to Rape Your Wife, STUDENT
LAWYER 21, 57 (1980). See also Schwartz, supra note 2, at 51.
148. See Beinen supra note 142, at 144 (indicating there were "less than [five]
prosecutions in three years . . . in the entire state [of New Jersey], which has a popu-
lation of nine million"). See also Schwartz, supra note 2, at 48.
149. Griffin, supra note 147, at 57. See also Note, supra note 9, at 260.
150. Freeman, supra note 76, at 6.
151. See generally Freeman, supra note 76, at 6-8.
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The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), in its
study of forcible rape, conducted interviews with twenty-nine non-mari-
tal rape victims who did not report the crime,15 2 and listed the reasons
for their failure to report. 153 The reasons spouses do not report rape are
even more complex. Some wives internalize the reason for the rape and
see themselves at fault."" Some are too "ashamed to talk about it,"'aS
and "prefer to keep this humiliating experience private."' 56 Victims of
marital rape may fail to report because of fears of "loneliness, loss of
.. .psychological security and admission of failure. . . ."151 Addition-
ally, wives may not report the rape because of financial inability to live
without the economic assistance of their husbands. 58 In essence, then,
there are three significant barriers to conviction arising from the atti-
tudes of victims of marital rape. First, the victim has the attitude that
if her husband is the offender, it is not rape. Second, even when the
wife perceives the act as rape, other fears result in her not reporting the
crime. Finally, these attitudes and fears, when coupled with the fact
that in some Florida districts eighty percent of victims of domestic vio-
152. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW
ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FORCIBLE RAPE,
FINAL PROJECT REPORT, 15 (1978) [hereinafter cited as FORCIBLE RAPE].
153. The table shows an ordered rank of the reasons victims did not report to
police.
Reasons for Not Reporting the Rape to Police.
(N = 29) (Multiple Answers Possible)
RANK REASONS % RESPONSE
1. Fear of Treatment by Police or Procedures 52%
2. Fear of Trial Procedures 34%
3. Fear of Publicity or Embarrassment 34%
4. Didn't Want Family or Friends to Know 34%
5. Lack of Interest by Police 31%
6. Fear of Revenge by Offender 28%
7. Procedures Too Time-Consuming 17%
8. Didn't Want Him Arrested/Punished 14%
9. Probably Couldn't Identify Him 10%
10. Didn't Think Police Would Believe You 3%
11. Lack of Evidence/No Proof 0%
Id. at 15.
154. Freeman, supra note 76, at 7.
155. Id.
156. Griffin, supra note 147, at 57.
157. Finkelhor & Yllo, supra note 75, at 462.
158. Note, supra note 9, at 260.
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lence drop the reported charges,159 indicate that victim non-cooperation
is a major hurdle to successful prosecutions for marital rape.
California has had some success in implementing marital rape
laws.160 The reason for this success has more to do with the educational
campaign that occurred when the statute was drafted, than with the
statute itself.1 61 Women's groups, people in the criminal justice sytem,
and citizens in general, were educated as to the existence of marital
rape and its prevalence in society.16 2 Following California's example, a
state seeking to eliminate the marital rape exemption must not only
enact a statute which permits the prosecution of husbands, but must
make an effort to educate its citizens. If this occurs, victims will more
frequently recognize the act as a rape and report it to the police, and
citizens who will become prospective jurors will realize that husbands
can and should be convicted for raping their wives.
Some California cities, as well as cities in other 'west coast states,
have implemented no drop policies which effectively reduce victim non-
cooperation after they report a crime.'1 3 No drop policies have been
used to secure victim cooperation in many kinds of domestic violence
cases. Prosecutors implementing this policy encourage victim coopera-
tion by reassuring the victim that the state is responsible for the prose-
cution and warning the victim that once the charge is filed it will not be
dropped.164 In Anchorage, Alaska, a spouse abuse victim was jailed for
contempt for non-cooperation.10 5 However, most prosecutors have not
taken such drastic measures in the implementation of existing no drop
policies and have substantially reduced victim non-cooperation. 66
Greater victim cooperation will cause police and prosecutors to take
domestic violence seriously and give it the priority it deserves.""1 With
159. See L. LERMAN, supra note 45, at 35. In response to a questionnaire, the
district attorney's office in Jacksonville, Florida estimates 80% of victims of spouse
abuse drop the charges. Id.
160. CAL. PENAL CODE § 262 (West Supp. 1981). See also Schwartz, supra note
2, at 49.
161. This view was expressed in a telephone interview with Laura X, of The
National Clearinghouse on Marital Rape, 2325 Oak St., Berkley, Ca. 94208. (Aug. 5,
1984).
162. Id.
163. L. LERMAN, supra note 45, at 34-36.
164. Id. at 45.
165. The National Law Journal, Aug. 22, 1983, at 4.
166. L. LERMAN, supra note 45, at 34.
167. Id. at 33.
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the knowledge that prosecutors will pursue their complaints aggres-
sively and with sensitivity, victims who would not report the rape due
to fear of the treatment they would have received from police and pros-
ecutors, will be encouraged to report the crime, further enhancing the
likelihood of convictions. 168 These three approaches, legislation, educa-
tion, and a no-drop policy, would enhance victim cooperation and lead
to a greater number of convictions.
B. Police Assistance
Police are hesitant to respond to calls relating to marital vio-
lence.169 Their reluctance to respond results from infrequency of prose-
cution and a fear for their own safety due to the extreme violence in
marital disputes.'1 0 When there has been a prior relationship between
the victim and the attacker, police are more likely to deem the charge
of rape as unfounded and fail to act on the complaint.' 7" Police have
wide latitude as to whether action should be taken and are usually
"highly suspicious of rape complaints.1'1
Married women are less likely to seek police intervention than
women who are divorced.173 Also, it has been determined that if a po-
lice officer holds subsequent police investigatory interviews at the police
station, instead of at the victim's current residence, there is a higher
rate of victim attrition.17 4 Therefore, even when married women report
the sexual battery, "[r] egardless of the truth of the charge, most mari-
tal rape complaints will not survive police investigation. 1 7 5 "[M]ost
rape cases are never presented for prosecution; . . .[they] simply die a
bureaucratic death. . .. ,,176 In cases where the victim knows the of-
fender, for example, the possibility of a victim's consent halts further
development of the case beyond the investigatory stage. 71 Attitudes of
police reflect attitudes of society. In marital rape, the police officer will
168. Id. at 34.
169. Note, supra note 9, at 246.
170. Id.
171. Hall, supra note 143, at 940. See also Pracher, supra note 10, at 738.
172. See FORCIBLE RAPE, supra note 152, at 31.
173. McLeod, Victim Noncooperation in the Prosecution of Domestic Assault,
21 CRIMINOLOGY 395, 405 (1983).
174. FORCIBLE RAPE, supra note 152, at 34.
175. Pracher, supra note 10, at 739.
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often find the complaint unfounded because of the existence of the pre-
vious consensual sexual relationship, and the fact that the relationship
creates a nearly insurmountable problem of proof. Married women may
report marital rape in cases where violence and physical injury exist.178
The police will investigate and bring the case to the prosecutor when
there is evidence of extreme violence.179 Cases of marital rape not ris-
ing to this level of violence and physical injury may not get beyond the
investigatory phase,180 cutting off the chance of prosecuting the case.
Although attitudes biased against rape victims may in general be
changing,181 in cases of marital rape, a woman may still need to be
"bruised, bloody, and damned near dead 82 .. .for the activity to be
considered not consensual.'' Therefore, even when a victim is willing
to report the sexual battery to the police, she may find police reluctant
to act.
C. Prosecutor Discretion
The prosecutor has great discretion in filing charges.8 4 Prosecu-
tors may be reluctant to file rape charges because of the many difficul-
ties in obtaining convictions. 85 Also, not every prosecutor agrees on
what constitutes rape. 86 In a marital rape, unless there is the use of
force likely to cause serious injury, a prosecutor may feel the jury
would not convict' 8 7 and, therefore, not prosecute.' Frequently in rape
178. Freeman, supra note 76, at 6.
179. Hall, supra note 143, at 941.
180. L. LERMAN, supra note 45, at 14.
181. News/Sun Sentinel, Aug. 12, 1984 § A, at 15, col. 1 (Palm Beach Edi-
tion)(citing Lunt, Juvenile Crime in Florida: Myths and Facts, indicating that arrests
for forcible rape in 1983, have increased by 70.9% since 1975).
182. Note, supra note 16, at 347 (quoting a past victim of rape).
183. Id.
184. FORCIBLE RAPE, supra note 152, at 48.
185. Id.
186. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE. LAW
ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FORCIBLE RAPE:
A MANUAL FOR FILING AND TRIAL PROSECUTORS, PROSECUTOR'S VOLUME III 10
(1978).
187. Telephone interview with Jayne Weintraub, prosecutor in the case of State
v. Rider (Aug. 14, 1984). Weintraub indicated a jury is unlikely to convict without
severe force likely to cause serious personal injury.
188. In State v. Rideout, No. 108, 866 (Marion County Or. Cir. Ct. 1978), pros-
ecutor Garry Gortmaker stated in a pretrial remark that "if it had happened in the
bedroom and he didn't beat her up, I'd agree with the other side." Barry, supra note
1985]
25
Ruby: Problems of Convicting a Husband for the Rape of his Wife
Published by NSUWorks, 1985
Nova Law Journal
cases, a prosecutor will dismiss the case if the victim is reluctant to
fully cooperate at trial."8 9 Also, if a victim of rape does not endorse a
negotiated plea, it influences the prosecutor to reject it. 190 Therefore, it
is evident that victim cooperation and serious victim injury are the
most important factors in influencing the decision of prosecutors to
bring the case to trial.
Unfortunately, it has been found that often prosecutors "uninten-
tionally discourage victims from following through with prosecu-
tion." 191 The victim is made to feel that she is "responsible for the
prosecution of the case and for whatever penalty is ultimately im-
posed,"' 92 despite the fact that rape is a felonious crime against the
state. The prosecutor can promote victim cooperation if the prosecutor
explains that the state is responsible for filing the charge and prosecut-
ing the case, and that the victim will not be allowed to effect a dismis-
sal of the charge, once filed.' 93 Cities that have implemented this policy
in wife battering cases have experienced a greater number of convic-
tions, due to victim cooperation. 94 Therefore, there is a great need for
prosecutors to become more sensitized to the victim's needs in order to
avoid unintentional discouragement. At the present time, prosecutors
may only choose to prosecute a marital rape case where there is ex-
treme force likely to cause serious injury.' However, as more cases
are prosecuted and jurors recognize that marital rape occurs frequently
without extreme violence and severe injury, prosecutors will likely be-
gin to prosecute those cases. Prosecutors can promote victim coopera-
tion with appropriate policies, and as a result enhance conviction rates.
D. Attitude of the Bench
The judge's attitude toward marital rape can impact on the jury's
decision in at least two ways. First, the general demeanor of the judge
may sway the jury, which tends to look upon the judge as the ultimate
authority figure in the courtroom.' 96 The judge may feel that it is im-
146, at 1091.
189. Hall, supra note 143, at 951.
190. Id. at 952.
191. L. LERMAN, supra note 45, at 33.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 45.
194. Id. at 34.
195. See supra note 187.
196. L. HOLMSTROM & A. BURGESS, THE VICTIM OF RAPE: INSTITUTIONAL RE-
[Vol. 9
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possible to rape one's wife and unconsciously reinforce similarly held
beliefs of jurors.197 Second, the judge's discretion in deciding when cer-
tain evidence is admissible, especially evidence of prior sexual conduct,
influences the outcome of the case.Y98 The judge's role should be to
weigh the evidence according to the rules of evidence, and to admit the
evidence when the probative value outweighs its prejudicial value. 99
There is a belief that in many states, including Florida, judges apply
discretion to the admissibility of evidence that does not conform to stat-
utory provisions.200 In cases where the judge abuses his discretion, and
the jury acquits the defendant, the state is unable to appeal due to the
constitutional ban'of placing the defendant in double jeopardy.2 1
The judge's admission of evidence of rape trauma syndrome0 2 in
cases of marital rape could be enormously helpful in the prosecution of
husbands, especially where there is no evidence of severe physical in-
jury. The acute symptoms of rape trauma syndrome include feelings of
"shock, numbness, bewilderment, fear, terror, disgust, humiliation, vul-
nerability, 'powerlessness, anxiety, and shame. 203 It has been docu-
mented that most rape victims continue to suffer from rape trauma
syndrome at least one year after the rape.20 4 The Kansas Supreme
Court and the Montana Supreme Court recently permitted evidence of
ACTIONS 158-62 (1978). See also J. MARSH, A. GEIST, & N. CAPLAN, supra note 108,
at 58-62.
197. Chappel, Forcible Rape and the Criminal Justice System, 22 CRIME & DE-
LINQ 125, 136 (1976).
198. Note, supra note 15, at 156 (juries are likely to acquit when inflammatory
evidence of prior sexual conduct of the victim is admitted).
199. Hibey, supra note 18, at 326.
200. Nicholl, Idaho Code § 18-6105: A Limitation on the Use of Evidence Re-
lating to the Prior Sexual Conduct of the Prosecution in Idaho Rape Trials, 15 IDAHO
L. REV. 323, 342-43 (1979). See also Beinen, supra note 142, at 147-48.
201. Note, supra note 15, at 158.
202. In State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 653, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (1982) the
psychiatrist, Dr. Modlin, testified that "[s]ymptoms of rape trauma syndrome include
fear of offender retaliation, fear of being raped again, fear of being home alone, fear of
men in general, fear of being out alone, sleep disturbance, change in eating habits, and
sense of shame." Id. See also Note, Scientific Evidence in Rape Prosecution, 48
UMKC L. REv. 216, 221-22 (1980), where the author indicates his opinion that "most
trial courts . . . would allow the jury to consider the evidence [of rape trauma
syndrome]."
203. Becker, Skinner, Abel, Howell & Bruce, The Effects of Sexual Assault on
Rape and Attempted Rape Victims, 7 VICTIMOLOGY 94, 95 (1983).
204. Id. at 99.
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rape trauma syndrome to be introduced at trial.205 The Kansas Su-
preme Court held that rape trauma syndrome was a sufficiently devel-
oped phenomena which "is generally accepted to be a common reaction
to sexual assault. 206
In Anderson v. State,07 the Florida Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal held that "[tlhe trial court should have excluded the testimony
related to the changes in the victim's behavior pattern following the
[sexual] assault. '20 8 However, the court concluded that the admission
"constituted harmless error"209 and had "no real prejudicial effect; ' 210
the court therefore denied a new trial. 211 The court ignored the exis-
tence of rape trauma syndrome. In ruling that the testimony should
have been excluded, the court relied on a 1919 case 212 which stated
that "[w]hat happened after the criminal act in no wise affected either
the guilt or innocence of the accused. Her giving birth to a dead child,
her sufferings, the impairment of her health, were not material to the
issues involved." '213 However, in Division of Corrections v. Wynn,21 4 the
Florida First District Court of Appeal indicated that the admission of
rape trauma syndrome was an appropriate use of judicial discretion.21 5
Florida courts should acknowledge the significant development of
rape trauma syndrome and battered wife syndrome. Florida judges
could enhance convictions for marital rape if they follow the example
of the Kansas and Montana Supreme Courts and admit evidence of
rape trauma syndrome when the defense is consent. In addition, Flor-
205. Compare Marks, 231 Kan. at 653, 647 P.2d at 1299 and State v. Liddell,
- Mont. -, 685 P.2d 918, 923 (1984), with State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227
(Minn. 1982); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1984); and People v. Bledsoe, 36
Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984)(reject evidence of rape trauma
syndrome). See also Dobson, Survey of Kansas Law: Evidence, 625 U. KAN. L. REV.
662, 663-64 (1984), which raises interesting problems concerning introduction of col-
lateral issues and possible adverse outcomes if a victim does not suffer from rape
trauma syndrome.
206. Marks, 231 Kan. at 653, 647 P.2d at 1299.
207. 439 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).




212. Bynum v. State, 76 Fla. 618, 622, 80 So. 572, 573 (1919), rev'd on other
grounds, Hunter v. State, 95 So. 115, 116, 118 (Fla. 1923).
213. Id.
214. 438 So. 2d 446 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
215. Id. at 448.
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ida courts should admit evidence of battered wife syndrome to show
that the wife had a reasonable belief that her husband's threats of vio-
lence would be carried out. Problems of proving marital rape would
further diminish if Florida judges use their discretionary powers to ex-
clude prior sexual conduct admitting it only when the pattern of sexual
conduct could have no other possible meaning but consent. Finally, if
judges exhibit a courtroom demeanor that is cordial to the anxious vic-
tim, and refrain from any actions or tone which show their own bias to
the jury, convictions for marital rape should increase.21 6
E. The Jury
The most difficult task for a prosecutor in a case of marital rape is
to convince the jury that a husband can actually rape his own wife.217
A 1966 study218 indicates that jurors will most likely not convict a de-
fendant for rape when the defendant and the victim have had prior
sexual relations, even when there is evidence of violence.21 9 The same
study demonstrates that when a victim's character is shown to be tar-
nished, the jury is also apt to acquit the defendant. 20 Recently, ques-
tionnaires were sent to judges in Michigan to assess changes in jury
attitudes under Michigan's Criminal Sexual Conduct Law.221 A major-
ity of the judges thought jurors were less conservative than in the past,
and would more often render guilty verdicts in rape cases.222 The
judges indicated that the change in jury behavior was due to "(1)
changes in public attitudes regarding sexual behavior, (2) public
awareness about rape, and (3) the impact of the women's movement,
." rather than the statute itself. 223 However, many jurors still come
to court with numerous stereotypical notions about rape. 24 One of
216. Miami Herald, Sept. 18, 1984, at BI, B2, col.l. The judge also has a duty
to impose proper sentences which reflect the seriousness of the crime. In Rider, the jury
convicted the husband because "[h]is story didn't hang together." The judge however,
mitigated Rider's possible life sentence to fourteen years, despite the fact Rider was on
parole for second degree murder at the time of the incident. The judge reasoned that
the Riders were "not by any means your typical surburban couple." Id.
217. See supra note 127.
218. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 48, at 252-57.
219. Id. at 251.
220. Id. at 249-51.
221. J. MARSH, A. GEIST & N. CAPLAN, supra note 108, at 56.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. L. HOLMSTROM & A. BURGESS supra note 196, at 168.
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these notions is that a husband cannot rape his wife.225
Therefore, citizens as prospective jurors will need to be educated
that marital rape occurs frequently and that it is a crime.2 6 Jurors
should be aware that victims of marital rape experience, at the very
least, the same trauma and humiliation as other non-marital rape vic-
tims.22 7 When this educational process is complete it will be easier to
convince the jury that it is a crime to rape one's wife.
V. Conclusion
Florida is one of very few states which holds a husband criminally
liable for the rape of his wife, whether they are separated or living
together. The problems of proving marital rape, however, may bar the
successful prosecution of most husbands. The problem in obtaining con-
victions for marital rape is not an acceptable reason for states to retain
the exemption for husbands. "Many types of prosecutions are rare and
difficult-treason, for example-and yet we strongly uphold the need to
keep such laws on the books." '228
One obvious remedy for the problem of obtaining convictions for
marital rape lies in legislative reform which would permit the prosecu-
tion of husbands for marital rape. The reform should include rape
shield laws which eliminate the admissibility of prior sexual activity as
indicative of credibility or consent. Evidence of rape trauma syndrome
should be admitted in cases of marital rape to demonstrate lack of con-
sent to the sexual battery. Evidence of battered wife syndrome should
be admitted to show the victim had reason to fear her husband would
carry out his threats of inflicting bodily harm. However, the most effec-
tive way to enhance prosecutions for marital rape lies in the education
of victims, police, prosecutors, judges, and juries. Without changes in
the attitudes of these participants in the criminal justice system, re-
forms in the law, although important statements of public policy, will
not provide relief to the one out of seven wives who are raped by their
husbands. 29
Susan Ruby
225. Pracher, supra note 10, at 731-32. See also Griffin, supra note 147, at 57.
226. D. RUSSELL, supra note 1, at 2. See also Finkelhor & Yllo, supra note 75,
at 461.
227. See D. RUSSELL, supra note 1, at 190.
228. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 48.
229. D. RUSSELL, supra note 1, at 2.
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